liveaumap.com current territory lines in Syria. Y=PYD, DRK G=OES, LT G=FSA, R=SAA, BLK=Daesh
On March 29 Turkish National Security announced that, whether or not it’s objectives were met, Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) has ended. The operation began on Aug. 24 of last year in northern Syria, marking Erdogan’s redirected commitment against Daesh (also known as ISIS) as a Coalition and NATO member. (Click on the links to learn more about the origins and progress of OES)
In early March, the Assad regime’s SAA created a swath of territory separating the OES/Daesh front which also halted Turkish advancement upon Kurdish territory. Having Daesh, Turkey’s alibi (for their military presence in Syria), held beyond arm’s length by regime forces caused OES to change their priorities and advance upon Kurdish PYD-held Manbij to the east of the Euphrates. Here, the US-backed Kurdish PYD allowed Syrian regime forces to form another buffer zone to ward off attacks by Turkish-backed forces on Manbij.
This buffer zone, now days after the ‘end’ of Turkey’s operation, is still present. The operation has ended only in name, as Turkish forces continue to occupy territory in Syria and train with allied FSA forces. Ankara is depending on the adoption of a referendum to be voted upon Sun, Apr. 16 as a kickoff to the next phase of Turkish operations in northern Syria. If President Erdogan of Turkey is granted extended executive powers through the referendum, the US’s current policies and alliances in Syria will meet more resistance from their Middle Eastern NATO ally.
SAA (red) buffer zone between Turkish forces and SDF is highlighted.
Turkish National Security expressed a more positive take on the operation’s hiatus, claiming that their success lies in a secured border against Daesh. Turkish Land Forces, along with the FSA groups they backed, started their operation in the border-city of Jarablus and went as far south as al-Bab and as far west as Azaz, a little over 1200 sq mi (about 2,000 sq km). However, this border was secured mostly by regime forces with territory gained from Daesh in an effort to oust Turkish forces.
Also in contrast to Turkey’s proclaimed success, Chairman Yasin Aktay of Erdogan’s AKP party made this equivalence the other day preceding a US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s visit to Turkey:
“We still expect the Trump administration to realize that there is no difference between PKK and PYD and Daesh… PYD is the extension of Assad and Assad means Iran, so when you help PYD, it means that you help Iran, indirectly.”
The PKK, a Kurdish group in Turkey, is considered a terrorist group by Turkey and the US. The Syrian Democratic Forces within the US-backed PYD have denied any current connections to the PKK and are most definitely not in league with or of the same ideological persuasion as Daesh. Aktay’s elevation of the Kurdish threat to that of Daesh illustrates Erdogan’s fully realized and uncensored vision of Turkish operations in Syria and that operations will surely continue to crack down on other geopolitical threats within Syria, namely the PYD and its affiliates.
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson leaves after a wreath-laying ceremony at Anitkabir, the mausoleum of modern Turkey’s founder Ataturk, in Ankara, Turkey, March 30, 2017.(REUTERS/Umit Bektas)
Meanwhile, Al Hayat reports around 30,000 Syrian rebel FSA troops, possibly including some of those who participated in OES, are readying themselves for an offensive against al-Qaeda in Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as al-Nusra Front, in the west. In the past, many fledgling FSA branches have had to make compromises with HTS in order to keep control over territory from the regime. These ties proved controversial to pro-regime news outlets, especially for Russia Today during the siege of Aleppo which ended with over 40,000 total civilian deaths. The consequences of less rebel attention towards Turkish operations are uncertain, however it is important to note that it is likely their progress and outcomes will influence each other
In speculations made by Turkish nationalists on social media as well as reports from Al Hayat, it is thought that Tal Abyad, a Kurdish-held city in Syria along the Turkish border, is considered a likely first target for future Turkish operations. Turkish forces could then forge directly south to Raqqa city, severing the Kurdish northeastern enclave in two. The cities of Kobane, Manbij, and al-Tabqah would be isolated in a four-front battle with Turkey, Turkish-backed forces, the SAA, and Daesh. And without proper Coalition backing, these territories could slip from Kurdish control.
This kind of assault on US-backed forces, as the WSJ reports, is what is likely to strain US-Turkish relations in the months to come. Erdogan and Trump have proven to play on their strongman approuach to foreign policy, and as NATO allies with the two largest militaries in the international organization, their conflicting political agendas in Syria could cause further unnecessary aggression. Erdogan now suggests favoring a Russian alliance in the face of the US’s support of Kurdish forces in the fight against Daesh.
The overlapping conflicts of interest in the Syrian civil war made by the proxies and alliances of superpowers like the US, Turkey, Iran, and Russia, are the cause behind many of the hangups in the Syrian peace process. The so-far unsuccessful Syrian peace talks in Astana have been endlessly complicated and prolonged because of infighting and nuanced alliances. It isn’t certain if the continuation of Turkish operations are exactly contingent upon the adoption of the AKP’s proposed referendum, which has received much negative press and criticism.
