Maps of the current fronts surrounding Euphrates Shield territory. IF UNFAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN AND TERRITORIES MENTIONED BELOW PLEASE REFER BACK TO THIS MAP.
Turkish and FSA Syrian rebel fighters of OES started their operations in Syria in August 2016. Its forces have a dual purpose to (a) oust US-backed SDF (Syrian Kurds) from their strongholds in the northeast; and (b) participate in Coalition efforts to oust Daesh from northern territories. Turkey is an adversary of both the Syrian regime and the SDF. The SDF have absorbed current and former FSA (Free Syrian Army) groups such as Jaysh al-Thuwar. Vetted groups from both opposition factions are backed by Coalition members, the same Global Coalition Against Daesh of which Turkey is a member.
Euphrates Shield (green), advance upon Daesh (black). SAA (red) to the south (as of Feb. 17, 2017)
After months of sharing a territorial border within Syria, Turkish-backed and Syrian regime forces have started a long-expected confrontation. On February 17 FSA forces of OES liberated al-Bab from Daesh along with the city’s satellite-towns of Qabasin and Bzaa. Tadef’s liberation was confirmed prematurely with 37 Daesh fighters killed. Although most of the city has been cleared, there are still members of Daesh within the area as well as mines and IEDs (improvised explosive device) that need to be cleared.
On February 24th, the small city of Tadef, located just south of al-Bab in northern Syria, became the site of a two-front battle fought by three different groups: the Turkish-backed opposition fighters of Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), the regime’s forces (SAA-Syrian Arab Army), and Daesh/ISIS. Each side is fighting the other as the three territories come in contact with one another: OES from the north, Daesh from the southeast, and SAA from the southwest.
Since then, SAA forces have moved through Daesh territory along the southern front of Euphrates Shield. In an effort to block the entire breadth of OES’s southern front east of al-Bab, SAA (regime) forces are pounded Daesh positions in northeast Aleppo, about 40km southest of al-Bab. This move separated the two fronts, making it easier for SAA forces to manage them.
Yesterday, March 2, the SDF have ceded a massive swath of territory over to the SAA, supposedly in an effort to create a buffer zone that will protect civilians in SDF territory from OES offenses as they are blocked from moving south to Raqqa. This move is controversial as it could create a greater rift in solidarity between opposition forces both on the ground and in the Syrian peace talks. However, the Kurds and the Syrian regime have always had loose ties and less hostile attitudes towards each other. This can be evidenced by the untouched Kurdish Sheik Massoud territory in Aleppo.
Bashar Jaafari, the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations during the talks in Astana, Kazakhstan.
These events occur at a time when Syria’s UN envoy Bashar Jaafari, in his speeches at the peace talks, requested the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Syria calling the continuation of the operation a violation of Syrian sovereignty. Aleppo24 reported Turkish forces have started demolishing buildings on Aqil Mountain above al-Bab to make way for a military base. Turkish President Erdogan’s main goal for the operation has been to clear the Turkish-Syrian border of the semi-autonomous Kurdish-dominated Syrian territory of Rojava as well as the liberation of the city of Raqqa from Daesh.
Raqqa is located further south into Syria, making Erdogan’s goal inherently contrary to Syria’s wishes. But the predominantly Kurdish SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), as of this writing, are fighting Daesh just kilometers away from the city that has been a longtime stronghold for Daesh. Meanwhile those opposition forces attempting to liberate Raqqa are also preparing for potential clashes with regime forces in the future.
The UN-led Syrian talks are aimed at peaceful negotiations between the Syrian regime and the opposition. However, Turkey’s utilization of Syrian opposition groups for its operation in will be an awkward factor to account for as Turkey decides its next move. If Turkish forces leave FSA fighters to take on their battles against regime forces in northern Syria, it could be a serious detriment to any progress made during the peace talks. This lends to the question of whether Syria will acknowledge the overwhelming FSA presence in al-Bab as a chance to commit to a cessation of hostilities, or if the threat that Turkey poses supersedes either side’s tepid commitment to peace.
The FSA’s status of complicity in the Turkish operation alone could easily become an endless talking point for the regime, thus slowing down a process that has already yielded very little progress. Jaafari has already made the accusation that the Turkish and Syrian opposition delegations are attempting to disrupt and derail the talks.
The complex relationships between every party involved in the conflict (on and off the ground) does not create an environment that is conducive to smooth negotiations. Applying a simplified view of the conflict such as assigning absolute titles of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ to different sides or equating authority to legitimacy does not serve as a rational way to look at this conflict. On top of a lack of claimed responsibility for war crimes, the persistence of either side to use accusatory language when addressing each other has also provided obstacles to civil arguments.
