In the article Trump’s Unrealistic Expectations for NATO from earlier this week, The Fulda Gap critiqued Trump’s suggestion that NATO “wasn’t taking care of terror.” This article serves to substantiate the argument against the President’s perceptions on the role of NATO.
Part 2 of this series emphasized on the employment of Russian soft-power tactics in information warfare. Here, Part 3 briefly describes the hard-power tactics that are later coupled with soft-power to enforce their narrative.
Successes in Russian Information Warfare
By the time the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the Revolutions of 1989 had already made clear that the people of former Soviet states did not affiliate themselves with Moscow. The Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia jumped at the opportunity to join NATO to ensure their territorial integrity.
Ukraine, however, has only come close to proactively seeking membership. This seems to be a missed opportunity in light of recent events, i.e. the Russian annexation of Crimea and territory along the eastern border of Ukraine now known by pro-Russian separatists as Novorossia. Aram S’s article thoroughly describes the history of Ukraine’s post-Soviet relations with Russia up to the most recent escalations of violence.
Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine, people gather belongings from the rubble of their homes.
Russia’s self-imposed historical amnesia has ushered in more complex relations between Russia and the West. The situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate, setting precedents for possible future infractions upon sovereign borders of former Soviet states. Surrounding these geopolitical tensions, “Russia’s political leaders…have succumbed to their own image of imperial grandeur, which makes them think in terms of spheres of influence.”
Former Soviet states are therefore subject to “limited sovereignty,” indicative of an unspoken bond which overrides international law and the “inviolability of borders.” Any efforts by the West to support these states, whether through NATO or the EU, are presented to those who subscribe to Kremlin-bolstered media outlets as potential territorial threats to Russia and its sphere of influence.
So far in the Syrian conflict, Russia has backed President Assad in his campaign against Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups. The FSA consists of many groups affiliated with the movement started by officers who defected from the Syrian Army (SAA) in 2011 to oust the oppressive regime who, in the face of mass public unrest, unleashed its military power onto civilians.
Russia’s propaganda machine has served to defend Assad’s claims that these rebel groups are the dangerous terrorists threatening the Syrian people which led to the fall of Aleppo. This narrative was enforced in the most cynical nature when Russian MPs and humanitarian aid workers showed up in Aleppo to feed the hungry and provide medical services to the people they had previously been bombing. Weeks later, Russia started drafting a new constitution for Syria.
Cyclists in Syria drive by shelled out truck from an aid convoy.
The Russian propaganda satellite of Russia Today aptly named Sputnik News released articles slandering the International community for not sending in humanitarian aid. However back in September, Putin and Assad had to deny multiple accusations of attacking aid convoys. RT and Sputnik continue to congratulate Russia and Assad for bringing peace back to Aleppo, with hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths under their belts.
So far, the Trump administration has not publicly proclaimed their actual goals for NATO in the future, however with the amount of stress researchers and experts at the NATO Defense College put on combatting Russian information warfare, it would be wise for the administration to head these warnings. While it is important for member states such as Turkey and those in the coalition against Deash/ISIS, this is not priority for NATO. What remains a priority is preventing what happened in Ukraine from happening in other Eastern European countries. This means culminating tactics in countering counter-information from Russia’s media outlets and government.
Most references to Russian information warfare tactics within this article came from the following NATO Defense College research papers provided here for further reading (some have already been linked to above):
