Article 4. The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and good-neighborliness and in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, shall consult with each other and shall, by agreement, take the necessary steps to safeguard the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries.
In the interest of strengthening their defensive capacity, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop their co-operation in the military field on the basis of the relevant agreements concluded between them.
Afghanistan and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Co-
Operation. Signed at Moscow on 5 December 1978
Military air power is one of the most effective and powerful instruments of modern conflict. Since WWII, American military planners have striven to maintain air superiority anytime US forces are on the ground. By overwhelming any state enemy with superior numbers, training, and equipment, the US military’s air branches have demonstrated as recently as the 1991 Gulf War, the massive firepower which can be brought to bear on conventional ground forces. The jet age has seen a few well-documented instances of aerial warfare between factions, from American F-86 Sabres in MiG Alley during the Korean War in the 1950s to Israeli pilots memorizing the speech patterns of their individual Egyptian adversaries in order to better engage them during the 6-Day War of 1967. When most people think of air superiority, they might picture a high-tech fighter jet flying over, or maybe they’ll think of a long-range radar aircraft such as the E-3 Sentry, capable of seeing almost anything in the air around it. In a modern conflict, it is exceedingly difficult to succeed when your opponent has air superiority. Air power alone cannot win a conflict; at the same time, ceding the skies to your opponent almost guarantees a stalemate, at best. The lesson, that a small military force with potent anti-aircraft capabilities can deny a larger opponent air superiority, was one the Soviets would come to learn the hard way in Afghanistan.
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
The Soviet Union was a long-time backer of the Afghan government in Kabul. When much of rural Afghanistan rose in a series of uprisings against that government, the Soviet authorities moved to bolster the military forces of President Nur Muhammad Taraki. Beginning in 1978, this support came in the form of vastly increased military aid, including the shipment of large numbers of aircraft for use by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force (DRAAF). The Afghan Air Force, in the mid-1970s, was woefully unprepared for counterinsurgency (COIN) work. Based on open-source materials, the best rough estimate for Afghan air power on the eve of the civil war is as follows:
The initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 came with a modest air wing; one fixed-wing squadron of MiG-21 fighter jets, along with two squadrons of Mi-8 transport helicopters and one of Mi-24 attack helicopters. The MiG-21s were sent with the intention of keeping Iranian aircraft out of Afghan airspace; they were not originally intended to counter the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and were in fact prohibited from crossing within 15km of the Pakistan/Afghanistan border at the start of the war. Soviet ground forces were initially tasked with opening, and keeping open the supply lines from the USSR to Kabul, namely Asian Highway 76 (AH76), which runs from Kabul to the Soviet (now Uzbekistan) border town of Termez, across the Amu Darya river. Quite rapidly, then, the Soviet air contingent in Afghanistan ballooned in size and scope, as did the volume/scale of aid to the DRAAF. In addition to the immense Soviet strategic transport and bomber capabilities (those of Long-Range Aviation and Military Transport Aviation), the Soviet 40th Army headquarters in Tashkent could call on the Turkestan Motorized Division (MD) for Frontal Aviation assets. These included, by 1988, at least 145 combat aircraft (90 Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot; 45 Mikoyan MiG-23 Flogger B/G; 10 Sukhoi Su-17 Fitter).
As the war progressed, and especially with the introduction of American-made FIM-92A Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, the Soviet and Afghan air components were both forced to fly above the ceiling of the Stinger’s missiles, limiting both the effectiveness and the overall roles possible. Soviet aircraft were reduced to patrolling main highways and roads, assisting with aerial bombardment of populated areas, and transport of supplies (at night). Soviet pilots, fearful of capture by the Mujahideen in the event of a shoot-down, opted for safety over accuracy, releasing their weapons far from and high above the target. This type of warfare infuriated the local population, who turned ever more against the Soviets and their allies in Kabul. The delivery of Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), through their Pakistani partners at Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) immediately challenged Soviet air superiority over Afghanistan. Although themselves lacking an air force of any kind, the Mujahideen managed to dramatically reduce the effectiveness of the Soviet air forces. The lesson for use in irregular warfare was not lost on the Soviets, who have mimicked the technique in the Russian Army in East Ukraine since 2014.
Zia’s Hawks: Enter the Pakistan Air Force
As the Soviets were forced to withdraw to large cities and major roadways, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) began asserting itself along the Afghan/Pakistan border, resulting in numerous shoot-down incidents between the DRAAF and PAF. Pakistan had been operating under peacetime rules of engagement, with PAF fliers remaining inside Pakistani airspace and with orders to identify unidentified aircraft and, if ordered to do so, shoot them down. DRAAF/Soviet aircraft pressed their advantage, flying closer and closer to the border to strike Pakistan-backed Mujahideen forces. Under tremendous public pressure to “do something”, the PAF deployed Dassault Mirage fighters to Kamra Airbase, along with two groups of F-16s to Samungli and Peshawar. The PAF also updated its rules of engagement, permitting far more leeway for pilots and ground controllers.
Despite the PAF deployments, border incidents continued. On 19 March 1986, numerous waves of DRAAF Su-22s, with Soviet Air Force MiG-23MLD escorts, struck Pakistani border posts near Tani and Zhawar. The initial strikes were followed up by Su-24 Fencer and Su-25 Frogfoot sorties. Ineffective Shenyang F-6 fighters were unable to do much to stem the tide of Soviet/DRAAF aircraft; lack of experience with their new equipment prevented the PAF’s new Dassault Mirage squadrons from scoring any kills. On 17 May 1986, Soviet/DRAAF aircraft flew strike missions against Mujahideen bases in the Panjshir valley as well as against bases inside Pakistan. Two PAF F-16As were vectored after some of the intruders, a group of Su-22s.
I called “engaged” and quickly locked onto one of the Sukhois. I got all parameters right on one of them, uncaged the missile seeker head, and fired my second AIM-9L missile…Taking tremendous lead, it [the missile] soon reversed towards the target in a series of corrections and exploded on impact with the turning Su-22.
Pakistan Air force f-16 pilot (via tom cooper/acig)
As 1987 came to a close, the Afghan government began losing its grip over some military units. In October, two DRAAF Mi-8 helicopter crews defected to Pakistan; weeks later, a DRAAF Su-22 attempted to bomb the Presidential Palace in Kabul. In response, the Soviets deployed the 115th Guards Independent Fighter Squadron, flying Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrums, to Termez Airbase with the explicit purpose of protecting Kabul’s airspace. Weeks later, at least four DRAAF Su-22s made another attempt to attack the Presidential Palace; All were shot down by Soviet MiG-29s.
Militia Air Forces in the Afghan Civil War Post-1992
In late 1987, Mujahideen forces besieged the city of Khost. In response, and unable to fly close-air support/low-altitude missions for fear of Stingers, the Soviet air forces deployed Tupolev Tu-22M-3 Backfire strategic bombers to Marry-2 Airbase. Squadron-sized flights bombarded Khost with up to 200 tons of bombs at a time. On some occasions, the aircraft dropped 3,000 kilogram FAB-3000 bombs, indiscriminate weapons in civilian areas. Accompanying these expensive, high-tech bombers was a flight of four Tu-22PD Blinder-E electronic warfare/ELINT aircraft, which flew to prevent PAF radars from detecting the Backfire flights. Aside from the Backfire missions, the PAF continued to harass DRAAF/Soviet aircraft near the Pakistan border throughout 1987 and into 1988. The exact records of who shot down whom in those closing months of the Soviet involvement are murky, and likely to remain mysterious for quite some time. For their part, the Soviets wanted to maintain a lack of conflict with Pakistan; they also were loathe to publicly disclose technological inferiority at the hands of the PAF’s American-made F-16s. Pakistan, obviously, was not about to go bragging to the world about how many aircraft from the angry superpower next door they’d shot down, either. It was in the interests of both sides not to publicize aerial skirmishes. Despite this, testimony from Afghan, Pakistani, and Soviet pilots affirm that there were several shoot-down incidents between the combatants toward the end of the war. Some of these were minor incidents; two F-16s vectored to scare off a stray Soviet helicopter or transport. Some, like an incident on 12 September 1988, were much larger.
Squadron Leader Khalid Mahmood was in close formation with his wingman, Squadron Leader Anwar Hussain, when both were vectored to intercept two contacts closing on the Pakistan border from Afghanistan. After closing, and much to the surprise of the two F-16 pilots, the “bogey” formation ended up being a flight of 12 Soviet MiG-23MLDs, with eight on a bombing run and four acting as escorts. A tense dogfight ensued, resulting in (depending on whom you believe) either the damaging or the shooting-down of two MiG-23s by the F-16s. In addition to flying missions against the PAF, Soviet air forces on a number of occasions were tasked with intercepting Iranian military aircraft. On 26 September 1988, two Soviet MiG-23MLs were vectored to intercept a flight of two Iranian Bell AH-1J Cobra attack helicopters flying southeast of Shindand. The kills claimed that day by the Soviet pilots were the last air-to-air interceptions of the Soviet air force in Afghanistan.
Following the Soviet withdrawal at the end of 1989, the DRAAF, with an inventory of approximately 253 combat aircraft and 90 armed helicopters, continued flying missions against the Mujahideen. DRAAF pilots flying MiG-21s in close-air support (CAS) missions did so against the threat of Stingers and other anti-aircraft weaponry. On top of flying CAS missions and the occasional strike mission against a fixed Mujahideen position (or a semi-static formation), the DRAAF was tasked with supplying remote outposts with provisions, as land routes were often in the hands of the Mujahideen. In April 1989, during the Mujahideen offensive on Jalalabad, the DRAAF flew regular CAS missions to support the city defenders. At one point, the DRAAF flew a team of journalists into Jalalabad, proof that they controlled the area. To emphasize their control, the Afghan military even flew President Najibullah to the city during one of the battles. Contrary to popular expectation, the communist regime in Kabul did not fall in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal.
However, it was not to last. In December 1989, two DRAAF Mi-34V attack helicopter pilots defected, with their helicopters, to Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Jamiat-e Islami. Then, on 5 March 1990, DRAAF General Tanai launched a coup against President Najibullah. Three fighter-bomber aircraft took off from Bagram Airbase and bombed the Presidential Palace in Kabul. Najibullah, having recently ramped up coup-proofing mechanisms, survived the attempt. General Tanai and his followers fled to Pakistan aboard an Antonov An-26 transport and an Mi-8 helicopter, which were impounded and brought into service with the PAF. As the year dragged on and the Mujahideen steadily gobbled up more and more territory nationwide, the DRAAF continued to atrophy. By October 1990 the DRAAF was a shadow of its former self, and Najibullah’s regime in Kabul was forced to rely on Soviet transport aircraft landing at Bagram and Kabul airbases, sometimes up to 30 times per day.
By 1992 the USSR was gone, and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was on the way out. As the central government in Kabul lost its grip over far-flung parts of the country, military units, including entire air bases, began to defect. In the northwest, General Rasheed Dostum formed his own militia, taking personnel and equipment from existing Afghan military forces in the area. The capture of Mazar-e-Sharif brought with it 120 aircraft; 60 fixed-wing MiG-21/Su-22 fighters, and 60 rotary-wing aircraft (likely Mi-8). Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Jamiat-e-Islami also operated its own air wing of at least two Mi-35 attack helicopters and a handful of Mi-8 transport helicopters. During the final assault on Kabul on 25 April 1992, Massoud and Dostum joined forces, with Dostum’s air force rushing Massoud’s fighters into the city to reinforce and take positions, pushing out Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s militia. In retaliation, Hekmatyar ordered his artillery units to bombard Kabul. Combat aircraft, primarily Su-22s, scrambled under orders from Dostum and engaged the artillery positions, but not before much of Kabul was destroyed and over 40,000 civilians were killed.
The following morning, Dostum’s aircraft once more took to the skies, this time providing CAS for Massoud’s forces as they stormed Kabul International Airport. With the airport secured, Dostum began flying in An-12 and An-26 aircraft full of Massoud soldiers to reinforce the position. Burhanuddin Rabbani was named the Transitional President of Afghanistan, and the anti-communist portion of the Afghan civil war came to a close.
By February 1993, Hekmatyar had been pushed out of artillery range of Kabul. Rabbani, still president, offered Dostum the position of Minister of Defense. Dostum was unhappy with the offer and, after an argument broke out, Rabbani offered the Ministry of Defense position to Massoud instead. Incensed, Dostum joined in an alliance with Hekmatyar, with their combined air forces (mostly Dostum’s) forming the Dostum Gulbuddin Militia Air Force (DGMAF). Massoud, now in charge of the remnants of the DRAAF, was unable to launch aircraft out of Bagram Airbase to defend Kabul as the much larger, better-equipped DGMAF had attacked both Bagram and Kabul airports starting in late 1993. Massoud managed to reconstitute some form of an air wing (under the Afghan Air Force, AAF) by January 1994, and used the aircraft (MiG-21MF) to good effect. On 12 January 1994, several DGMAF MiG-21s were spotted in the skies over Kabul. Massoud’s AAF fighters scrambled and shot down two of the attackers.
One of the most peculiar episodes in Afghan aviation, and military aviation in general, took place on 23 January during an attempted DGMAF airstrike in Bagram airbase. Following the first strikes on one of Bagram’s runways, at least four DGMAF pilots immediately defected, landing their jets on the undamaged, remaining runway. This was immediately followed by three more pilots defecting to Shindand Airbase, held by Hezb-e-Wahdat; this means that only one of the eight aircraft launched, that operated by General Barir (who ran the DGMAF), returned to base as planned. The DGMAF continued to suffer ill fortunes in 1995 when the Taliban emerged on the scene. By February Hezb-e-Islami was almost completely destroyed, while the remaining DGMAF units were pressed into combat against Ismail Khan’s forces in Herat. With more pilots being lost, Dostum needed a way to train a new class of combat airmen. Several MiG-21s and Su-22s were flown to Uzbekistan, to be exchanged for a few Uzbek Air Force Aero L-39 Albatros training aircraft.
Taliban on a Plane: The Rise of the IEAAF
With the collapse of Hekmatyar’s forces in the south, a new Afghan air force came into being, that of the Taliban Air Force (later the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Air Force, IEAAF). While many of the personnel of the IEAAF were former DRAAF/DGMAF pilots and mechanics, others still were brought in by Pakistan’s ISI to bolster the Taliban’s military capabilities.
On 3 August 1995, an Airstan (Russian air cargo company) Ilyushin Il-76TD, a four-engine jet transport aircraft, with seven Russian citizens on-board, was flying with supplies for anti-Taliban forces when it was intercepted and forced to land by a flight of Taliban MiG-21s. The aircraft was interned at Kandahar International Airport. The crew were held for over a year, with negotiations eventually including American Senator Hank Brown, but they proved mostly fruitless. Finally, after Senator Brown managed to convince the Taliban to allow the Russians to service the aircraft, the crew jumped at the opportunity to implement their escape plan. With three of their six Taliban guards at afternoon prayers, the Russians physically overpowered the last three guards and, drawing power from the aircraft’s APU (Auxiliary Power Unit), the pilot was able to start one of the four jet engines. As the aircraft taxied, the crew rushed through the procedures to start the remaining three engines, and with the aircraft lined up on the runway, they pushed the throttles forward.
Desperate to stop the aircraft, the Taliban guards at the base drove a fire truck onto the runway. The Ilyushin screamed into the air over the fire truck, but rather than climb into the sky, remained low and close to the ground. The crew was trying to evade Taliban radar coverage, which was, despite the condition of most other infrastructure, still rather operational. At least one Taliban Air Force MiG-21 scrambled into the air to search for the escaping crew, and a helicopter was launched to assist as well. The crew’s luck held, and they managed to fly to the United Arab Emirates, and from there, to Russia.
With the Taliban’s ideological impetus against non-religious education and technology, the fact that they were able to restore, maintain, and operate such a large number of jet aircraft and helicopters indicates some degree of outside support. Some of this expertise undoubtedly was purchased by or on behalf of the Taliban from other Afghan groups, but the sheer number of aircraft indicates likely technical support from the Pakistan Air Force as well.
Throughout the summer of 1995, both the AAF under Massoud and the DGMAF under Dostum continued to lose aircraft, for the most part to Taliban FIM-92A Stingers and a few Pakistani-supplied Anza missiles. The IEAAF, for its part, also took considerable losses, with at least three MiG-21s and one Mi-8 being shot down over Maydan Shah by Massoud’s forces during a single clash on 16 October. On 31 October three more IEAAF MiG-21s were brought down, two over Kandahar and one over Kabul. On 12 November, history was almost changed forever when two Mi-8 Hip helicopters, one carrying Mullah Omar, were shot down near Log. Obviously, Omar survived.
By the end of 1995, with the Taliban gaining more territory around the country and flirting increasingly with anti-Shia sectarian policies, neighboring Iran began looking to increase support to anti-Taliban factions. Tehran threw its support behind Massoud, while the Russian Federation chose to support Ismail Khan’s militia. Both countries began sending transport aircraft to supply their patrons, making deliveries to Jalalabad and Bagram. In December 1995, Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) F-14A Tomcat fighters were seen escorting IRIAF Il-76s at low altitude over Kabul. Desperate and dropped by the ISI, Hekmatyar joined in an alliance with Massoud, and began receiving the first of about 20 IRIAF C-130 deliveries of equipment and ammunition at Mazar-e-Sharif.
November also saw the end of the DGMAF, with a failed attempt to infiltrate Taliban air defenses (especially near Kandahar) resulting in heavy losses for the militia. Massoud, too, lost most of his MIG-21s and Su-22s from combat attrition and lack of spare parts. This left the IEAAF the undisputed holder of air superiority in Afghanistan. Under pressure from aerial bombardment (carried out by IEAAF Su-22s), Massoud’s defenses collapsed. Kabul, and nearby Bagram Airbase (with the majority of the AAF’s disabled jet fleet) were captured by the Taliban. By 1998, the Taliban and their supporters in Pakistan were ready to conquer Afghanistan in its entirety. At the beginning of 1997, the Taliban decisively defeated the Dostum Gulbuddin Militia, sending its members fleeing into the former Soviet republics. This left Massoud and the Northern Alliance as the main opponents to the Taliban. Pakistan began refurbishing the IEAAF at a faster pace, thus enabling the Taliban’s air wing to launch up to 30 strike missions per day, sometimes up to 160 per week (in 1998). Further, the Taliban began utilizing a few of the old An-12 and An-26 transport aircraft they’d captured for troop transport purposes. Upon its official renaming in 1998 (from “Taliban Air Force” to “IEAAF”), the wing operated around 30 MiG-21s. Alas, they were never really able to use these aircraft to their fullest, as they were left behind at Bagram Airbase when it was recaptured by Massoud’s forces later in 1998. The majority were either destroyed or disabled. Any hopes of them someday taking to the air again were permanently dashed during the American bombing campaign 2001, which targeted the airbase.
The IEAAF kept up the pressure on the Northern Alliance into 2000 with their non-Bagram aircraft, carrying out 160 strike missions over the course of two weeks against Northern Alliance supply and communications hubs near Taloqan. This would prove the final crescendo of the IEAAF, which saw at least eight MiG-21/Su-22 aircraft shot down by SA-14 MANPADS; none of the pilots were recovered, resulting in a significant personnel shortage for the air wing.
Aside from Afghan air forces, the Pakistan Air Force also began reportedly flying limited missions inside Afghanistan against the Northern Alliance in 2001. While ISI supplied the Taliban with equipment and supplies, PAF Nanchang A-5C ground attack jets of the 16th and 26th Squadrons flew strike missions. Neighboring Tajikistan was hostile to the Taliban, and thus allowed 25,000 Russian troops (many coming from the 201st Motor-Rifle Division) to be stationed near Dushanbe. They were joined by 12 Sukhoi Su-25BM/UM ground attack aircraft of the 186th IShAP, Mi-8 transport and Mi-24 attack helicopters, and various transport aircraft. Russian aircraft reportedly flew combat missions inside Afghanistan in 1992, 1995, and in the late 1990s. The Tajik Air Force itself was also reportedly active in supplying the Northern Alliance in the late 1990s.
The Islamic Revolution of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was also active in/over Afghanistan throughout the late 1990s, with F-14A Tomcats escorting Il-76 transports into Kabul, and RF-4E reconnaissance jets providing information for the Northern Alliance. Sometime in 1998 the IRIAF stood up Tactical Fighter Base 14 at Mashhad and stationed the 140th Tactical Fighter Wing, equipped with former Iraqi Air Force Mirage F.1EQ/BQ fighters, at the new base. They were later joined by Embraer EMB-312 Tucano turboprop aircraft and Bell AH-1J Cobra attack helicopters, along with UAVs (primarily to combat the rapidly-worsening drug problem). Finally, Uzbekistan’s air force was known to have launched a number of missions against the Taliban, one such mission resulting in the loss of the attacking Su-24 Fencer to Taliban anti-aircraft gunners.
On 9 September 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud granted an interview with an Arab camera crew. The “journalists” were members of Al Qaeda, and they detonated two bombs they had hidden in their equipment. Massoud was fatally wounded. Two days later, 19 young men hijacked four civilian airliners in the United States and turned them into guided missiles, killing thousands of innocent civilians. The 9/11 attacks, financed and directed from Afghanistan, can in a way be seen as a long-range (one-way) air strike against a distant enemy. The American response was an overwhelming air campaign, one that puts the Soviet invasion/occupation to shame (in terms of munitions released/equipment deployed). With the collapse of the Taliban regime and the liberation of Kabul, Afghanistan’s days of insurgent air forces seem to be a thing of the past. Time alone will tell if the new Afghan Air Force will write the next chapter of Afghan aviation history.
This article would not have been possible without the painstaking research of Tom Cooper and everybody at the now-defunct Air Combat Information Group (ACIG) website. ACIG can be accessed via the following archived link: https://archive.li/www.acig.org. All images courtesy Afghan Media Resource Center: https://archive.org/details/afghanmediaresourcecenter
